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Abstract: 2006 generally represented a solid year in terms of macroeconomic 
performance and labour market indicators, even under the threat of increasing 
inflation and interest rates. However, some favourable aggregate labour market 
indicators disguised major disparities at disaggregated regional, sectoral or 
demographic levels. The major development in the labour market was the 
implementation and operation of the WorkChoices legislation which will shape the 
industrial relations landscape in Australia for many years to come. This article 
presents an analysis of the performance of the macroeconomy and labour market, and 
reviews the developments of the WorkChoices legislation. 
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Introduction 
In a year dominated by inflationary (and associated interest rate) pressures from rising 
petrol prices and the continuing drought in Australia, labour market indicators 
generally remained healthy and robust with historically low unemployment rates and 
high labour force participation rates (LFPR). Total employment rose by 3 per cent 
over the year and the unemployment rate fell to a low of 4.6 per cent. High levels of 
labour demand have been driven by steady economic growth. However, the disparities 
in the sectoral and geographic distribution of economic growth in Australia, due in 
part to the strength of the minerals boom, have resulted in significantly different 
labour market outcomes across Australia.  
 
The most dramatic development in the Australian labour market, which will be felt for 
years to come, was the implementation and operation of the WorkChoices industrial 
relations legislation. A number of issues regarding this legislation warrant 
investigation and analysis. Initially, a number of inequitable outcomes for workers 
dominated the media coverage of this legislation. Other important developments 
included the first wage decision of the Australian Fair Pay Commission, the High 
Court challenge of the WorkChoices amendments and further legislative amendments 
to WorkChoices.   
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First the global and domestic 
macroeconomic context is explored. This is followed by an analysis of labour market 
indicators. Particular attention is given to the disparities emerging beneath seemingly 
robust aggregate indicators. Finally, we present a review of the implementation and 
operation of the WorkChoices legislation in Australia, followed by some concluding 
remarks.     
 
The Economic Context 
After the 2001 recession, the world economy started moving into an expansionary 
phase led by the United States, China and other East Asian countries but, by 
comparison, meager growth rates have been experienced in Japan and Europe. In 
general, global economic growth remained robust in 2006, with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) predicting  growth in the world economy in its September 
World Economic Outlook at 5.1 per cent in 2006 and 4.9 per cent in 2007 (IMF 
2006). Similar to Australia, in the US economy inflation has edged up because of 
capacity constraints and rising energy prices. Due to  past interest rate increases and a 
weaker housing market, economic growth was at a slower pace towards the end of 
2006 in both the US and Australia.  
 
On the other hand, the IMF is still expecting double-digit growth rates in China for at 
least the next two years. China’s expansion will positively impact on the rest of the 
world including Australia, but the picture for Japan is not very promising as their 
ongoing recovery is quite weak. Economic growth in Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom was promising in the first half of 2006 as a result of improved business 
confidence, stronger corporate balance sheets, and rising employment. However due 
to some dampening effects on consumer spending from the increase in the value 
added tax in Germany and the impacts of rising interest rates, economic growth is 
expected to be sluggish in 2007. There has been a significant world-wide surge in 
inflationary pressures driven by energy and other commodity price rises while 
economies, including Australia, reach capacity constraints. This has forced many 
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central banks to pursue tighter monetary policies. The contractionary monetary and 
fiscal policies in Australia, coupled with the lack of spending on infrastructure, 
capacity constraints, and skill shortages may hamper future  economic growth. 
 
On the back of strong Chinese demand and rising prices of coal and iron ore fuelled 
with the mild depreciation of the currency (proxied with the real exchange rate-real 
trade weighted), Australia received a substantial boost in 2006. The bulk of the 
commodity boom accrued to the mineral-rich states of Western Australia and 
Queensland. This recent boom in commodity prices could not come at a better time, 
helping to compensate for the fall in the growth of private investment  from 10 per 
cent in 2005 to 2.9 per cent in 2006. Without higher commodity prices, the Australian 
economy could have tipped into sharp downturn because of a downfall in the housing 
market. According to Table 1, Australia’s terms of trade (the ratio of export prices to 
import prices) rose by 6.8 per cent in 2006, taking the index to the highest level 
experienced since the early 1970s. An increase in the terms of trade can exert a 
multiplier effect on real income throughout the economy. During the last two years on 
average this boost has been 1.5 percentage points of GDP (Macfarlane 2005). The rise 
in income accrues to wage earners in the resource sector, some to domestic 
shareholders and a large amount through increased taxation and royalties to 
governments.  
 
Comparing September quarter figures in 2006 and 2005, GDP grew at 2.2 per cent in 
2006, about 0.7 per cent less than that of previous year, and well below trend growth 
of over 3 per cent. Similarly, the total number of hours worked also increased at 1.9 
per cent in 2006 but its growth rate was less than that of the previous year. At the 
same time inflation stood at 3.9 per cent, reaching or breaching the upper end of the 
Reserve Bank’s target range, despite several rate rises during the last year. Higher 
petrol prices and a sudden rise in fruit prices brought about by cyclone Larry triggered 
a bout of inflationary pressure in the economy. Table 1 shows that both inflation and 
the nominal unit labour cost increased equi-proportionally in 2006, supporting the 
view that labour market tightness contributed to a pick-up in wage inflation 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2006). 
However, the nominal rise in the unit labour cost in 2006 (3.9 per cent) was less than 
half of the one in 2005 (8.7 per cent). 
 
Inflation has been on the rise since 2003 and the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 
has been quite pre-emptive in its fight against inflationary pressures. Due to the 
impact of higher upstream price pressures and rising inflation, the RBA increased the 
official cash rate three times in 2006 (3 May, 2 August and 8 November) each time by 
25 basis points. The cash rate rose from 5.5 per cent in 2005 to 6.25 in 2006, resulting 
in a 1.1 per cent rise in the average mortgage rate. According to the OECD “the 
impact of high energy and exceptional fruit prices will fade away only gradually, 
headline inflation may not fall back within the 2-3 per cent target range until mid-
2007” (OECD 2006, p.118). As a result of a higher housing interest rate (8 per cent) 
and its adverse impact on housing affordability, real private investment (mainly 
residential construction) grew by only 2.9 per cent in 2006 compared to a 10 per cent 
growth in 2005. Undoubtedly the flattening of already high house prices and several 
interest rate rises slowed down the housing sector significantly.  
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As seen from Table 1, compared to 2005, the government increased its real current 
expenditure (5.3 per cent) more than its real investment expenditure (4.6 per cent) in 
2006, inducing partly more inflationary pressure on the economy. The annual growth 
rates of government current expenditure and investment in 2005 were 2.7 per cent and 
5.2 per cent, respectively. In 2006 real imports grew substantially and as strong as last 
year (7.3 per cent) but real exports registered 6 per cent growth which was three times 
more than that of 2005 (1.9 per cent), thanks to red-hot global demand for rising price 
of raw materials, which constitute 60 per cent of Australia’s total exports.  
 
Despite this positive change in the Australian economy, non-residents continued to 
receive a substantial net income (such as interest payments on Australia’s foreign debt 
and dividend payments to foreign owners of its mining companies) which constituted 
73 per cent of Australia’s current account deficit. Australia’s net income balance has 
been in deficit and volatile for more than twenty years now. According to Table 1, the 
government fiscal surplus in 2006 was 1.5 per cent of GDP or equivalent to $14.8 
billion  ($4 billion more than the previous year). As usual, the bulk of the trade deficit 
was financed through private borrowings mainly by Australian banks and financial 
institutions. It should be borne in mind that an ongoing drought also exacerbated the 
trade deficit. The Australian government has also managed to eliminate its debt 
through running large budget surpluses and asset sales. Some analysts have argued 
that given the large  budget surplus, the inflationary effects of the government’s tax 
cuts introduced in July 2006 were trivial (Business Monitor Online 2006). 
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Table 1 Key Economic Indicators in 2005 and 2006 
Variable Unit 2005 2006 
Real GDP growth % change 2.9 2.2 
Hours worked % change 3.1 1.9 
Terms of trade % change 12.4 6.8 
CPI % change 3.0 3.9 
Nominal Unit labour cost % change 8.7 3.9 
Real government expenditure % change 2.8 5.3 
Real household consumption % change 2.7 2.8 
Real Private investment % change 10.0 2.9 
Real Government investment % change 5.2 4.6 
Real exports  % change 1.9 6.0 
Real imports % change 7.6 7.3 
Imports  $ Billions 190.2 210.9 
Income received by non-residents $ Billions 58.0 68.0 
Exports of goods and services $ Billions 167.6 196.3 
Income paid by non-residents $ Billions 25.3 29.0 
Current account balance $ Billions -55.3 -53.5 
Unemployment rate % 5.1 4.6 
Participation rate % 64.4 64.8 
Fiscal balance $ Billions 10.8 14.8 
Fiscal balance % of GDP 1.2 1.5 
Real exchange rate-Real Trade Weighted Index  % change 3.2 -1.1 
Cash rate at the end of year % 5.5 6.25 
Housing interest rate % 7.1 8.0 
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2006a, 2006c, 2006d, 2006e); (b) Commonwealth Treasury 
(2006); (c) the Reserve Bank of Australia (2006). 
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Labour Force Developments 2006 
The Australian labour market continued to exhibit strong growth during 2006 with 
total employment rising by 3 per cent and the unemployment rate falling to an 
historically low 4.6 per cent. High levels of labour demand have been driven by 
steady, although not historically high, economic growth. However, the disparities in 
the sectoral and geographic distribution of economic growth in Australia, due in part 
to the strength of the minerals boom, have resulted in significantly different labour 
market outcomes across Australia. This section provides an overview of the 
Australian labour market in 2006 with particular emphasis given to the emerging 
disparities that are concealed by the summary indicators of employment growth and 
the unemployment rate.  
 
Since the recession of the early 1990’s the rate of employment growth has been both 
relatively stable, and relatively strong, by historical standards. This more stable 
pattern of employment growth continued in 2006 with employment rising by 3.0 per 
cent.  
 
Strong employment growth since the early 1990s has, however, coincided with a 
marked decline in the proportion of jobs that are full time. Part time work has grown 
much more rapidly than full time work for both men and women. In 2006 the strong 
growth of men in part time work continued with 9.6 per cent growth over the calendar 
year. Growth of full time jobs held by women (5.5 per cent) continued to outstrip 
growth in full time jobs held by men (2.0 per cent) over the same period. The number 
of women in part time work in 2006 declined slightly, with the number of women 
employed part time declining by 0.14 per cent. 
 
Strong employment growth combined with low unemployment rates have also 
resulted in record high labour force participation rates. Having begun 2006 at 64.4 per 
cent the LFPR rose to 64.9 per cent by December after reaching a record 65.0 per cent 
in August and September 2006. The steady growth in the LFPR over the past two 
decades conceals the rapid rise in female participation and the steady decline in male 
participation. Over the course of 2006, however, male labour force participation rose 
slightly from 71.9 per cent to 72.3 per cent. This was the first annual rise in the male 
LFPR since 1989. The female LFPR rose from 57.1 per cent in January 2006 to 57.8 
per cent by December.  
 
Despite the growth in the number of people entering the labour force, the strong 
growth in employment has resulted in a historically low unemployment rate of 4.6 per 
cent in December 2006. Over the course of 2006 the male unemployment rate fell 
faster than the female unemployment rate. In December 1995 the unemployment rate 
for both men and women was 5.2 per cent but by December 2006 the male rate had 
declined to 4.4 per cent while the female unemployment fell only 0.2 per cent to 5.0 
per cent. 
 
While unemployment is low by historical standards there are substantial differences in 
the unemployment rate across demographic and geographic groups. For example, 
youth unemployment, that is the unemployment rate among those aged 15-19, 
remains significantly higher than the unemployment rate in the broader community. In 
December 2006 the unemployment rate for those in this age group was 14.3 per cent, 
down from 15.6 per cent in December 2005. Despite this reduction the youth 
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unemployment rate is still three times higher than the unemployment rate for the 
entire labour force (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2007). 
 
The likelihood of being unemployed also varies significantly across geographic 
regions. Table 2 shows the disparities that exist between the small geographic areas 
with the highest unemployment rate and those with the lowest, with some areas 
reporting zero unemployment while other regions are experiencing unemployment 
rates of over 25 per cent. While regions such as Tanami and Sandover are quite 
remote, it is important to note that the centre of the capital city of Hobart, the tourism 
centre of Cairns, and the region of Playford on the outskirts of Adelaide are all 
experiencing unemployment rate of over 15 per cent (Dept workplace etc). 
 
While some suggest that excessive labour market regulation is a cause of 
unemployment, it should be noted  that within each state there are substantial 
disparities in unemployment despite the existence of uniform regulatory structures. 
Clearly the high unemployment rates experienced in regions such as Tanami and 
Hobart are caused by demographic and sectoral factors rather than ‘rigidities’ in the 
local labour market.  
 
The disparities between regions shown in Table 2 are also apparent in the interstate 
comparison of employment growth. Queensland (5.48 per cent) and the ACT (4.95 
per cent) saw the most rapid rate of job creation in 2006 while Tasmania was the only 
state to see employment decline. Despite the resources boom in Western Australia 
employment growth in that state was the second lowest in Australia at only 1.84 per 
cent. That said, in December 2006 the unemployment rate in Western Australia is 
among the lowest in Australia (3.1 per cent) while the unemployment rate in 
Tasmania was the highest in Australia at 6.1 per cent. The lowest unemployment rate 
was recorded by the Northern Territory at 2.4 per cent (Australian Bureau of Statistics 
2006a). 
 
The uneven sectoral impacts of the mining boom on the Australian economy have 
resulted in substantial disparities in the distribution of wage growth in 2006. Wages 
have grown more rapidly in Queensland (4.5 per cent) and Western Australia (4.3 per 
cent) than the national average of 3.8 per cent while employees in Victoria and South 
Australia received average increases of just 3.5 per cent and 3.7 per cent respectively. 
Similarly, employees in the mining and construction industries experienced much 
stronger wages growth in 2006 than those employed in the services sector (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics 2006b). 
 
The Implementation and Operation of WorkChoices Legislation 
The WorkChoices revolution dominated events in the Australian labour market in 
2006. Conceived in the aftermath of the Howard Government’s sweeping 2004 
election victory, the Workplace Relations Amendment (WorkChoices) Act 2005 (Cth) 
No. 153 passed on 7 December 2005 but much of the Act did not take effect until 27th 
March 2006. The legislation goes beyond the ambitions of earlier reform proposals 
and, although it contains some continuity with the previous system, breaks from it in 
very substantial ways. Draped in the language of fairness, the legislation is also firmly 
underpinned by the neo-liberal notion that the price of labour must be set at level 
which allows its supply to clear. Yet, as Briggs and Buchanan (2005) convincingly 
 8 
argue, WorkChoices blends ‘deregulatory rhetoric’ with a heavily interventionist 
approach that seeks to unduly control agreement making processes and outcomesi.    
 
The nuances of the introduced changes, their complexity and the associated 
compliance burden, have been well documented in extensive academic commentary 
(see for instance Cooney 2006; Chapman 2006; Ellem, Baird, Cooper & Lansbury 
2005; Fenwick 2006; Forsyth & Sutherland, 2006; Hall, 2006; Stewart, 2006; Waring, 
De Ruyter & Burgess 2006). Waring and Bray (2006) have summarised the 
substantial consequences of the legislation in terms of six key themes. These include 
the reduction of minimum standards and rights; the privileging of individual 
contracts; the disempowering of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission; the 
improvement of managerial prerogative and the weakening of unions; and, the 
increasing power of the state in employment relations. 
 
 
Table 2 Unemployment Rates in Selected Regions (September 2006) 
 
Statistical Local Areas Unemployment Rate - 
September 2006 
Tanami 25.4 
Sandover 21.8 
West Arnhem 19.7 
Daly 18.2 
Wacol 17.9 
Playford (Elizabeth) 17.1 
Hobart (Inner) 16.3 
Cairns (City) 15.1 
Bathurst (Melville) 14.9 
Ballarat (South) 10.2 
Auburn  10.1 
Lake Grace 0.3 
Victoria Plains 0.3 
Unincorp  (Lincoln) 0.0 
Kowen 0.0 
Weston Creek-Stromlo - SSD Bal 0.0 
Source: Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (2006) 
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Waring and Bray (2006) have suggested that the legislation results in the reduction of 
minimum standards and rights through abolishing the ‘no disadvantage test’ and the 
introduction of the Australian Fair Pay and Conditions Standard (AFPCS) – a 
statutory standard composed of just five minimum conditions against which 
agreements are tested. This arrangement represents a substantial reduction in 
minimum standards since the benchmark for agreements has fallen substantially from 
awards that (pre-reform) contained at least twenty matters to the five conditions of the 
AFPCS. The abolishment of rights to access unfair dismissal remedies for employees 
employed in businesses with 100 or fewer employees, is a further strong example of 
the reduction of minimum standards and rights under WorkChoices. 
 
The privileging of individual contracts is accomplished under WorkChoices. Under 
the legislation, these statutory individual contracts prevail over all other industrial 
instruments including collective agreements. Further, the legislation clarifies the 
legality of offering employment contingent on the acceptance of an Australian 
Workplace Agreement (AWA). As AWAs must only comply with the five conditions 
of the Australian Fair Pay and Conditions Standard, the legislation increases the 
likelihood of employment on below-award conditions.           
 
WorkChoices also removes the wage determination function from the Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) and places it in the hands of the newly 
formed Australian Fair Pay Commission.  The only remnant of wage determination 
power left to the AIRC is the narrow role it retains to arbitrate conditions of 
employment when the bargaining period has been terminated; and even then it must 
do so with reference to decisions of the Australian Fair Pay Commission. These 
changes along with the removal of access to remedies for unfair dismissal for a large 
section of the workforce are indicative of the extent to which WorkChoices 
disempowers the Australian Industrial Relations Commission. 
 
Most analysis of the Act has also observed the way in which it substantially improves 
managerial prerogative while further weakening the power of trade unions.  
Management now have an almost unfettered power to hire using whatever industrial 
instrument they choose, to unilaterally determine wages and conditions upon the 
expiry of a certified agreement and to fire with few impediments. Meanwhile, union 
activity is further circumscribed, inter alia, by tougher right of entry provisions and 
complex secret balloting procedures before protected industrial action can be taken. 
 
Waring and Bray (2006) also note the increasing power of the federal government in 
industrial relations as a result of the extensive use of the corporations power to take 
over much of the state’s industrial relations jurisdictions. Indeed McCallum (2006) 
has suggested that the reforms represent the ‘corporatisation of industrial relations’ in 
which labour law is increasingly supplanted by corporations law. As Stewart (2006) 
has observed, in reality a single industrial relations system is not created by 
WorkChoices since the constitutional mechanisms used by the federal coalition 
government do not provide complete jurisdictional coverage. Nonetheless, the federal 
government’s role in industrial relations is significantly magnified as a consequence 
of the takeover of much of the state systems.       
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Soon after the legislation came into effect, there were media reports of what appeared 
to be legal, though inequitable, applications of the legislation. A number of these 
cases occurred in low wage sectors of the economy consistent with some academic 
predictions of where the more extreme possibilities of WorkChoices would be 
explored.  Some of these cases are discussed in a NSW Parliamentary Inquiry report 
on the impact of WorkChoices published in November 2006. In particular, the NSW 
Parliamentary Committee on Social Issues (2006) identifies the reported case of 
employees at retailer Spotlight who had been offered AWAs which removed penalty 
rates, overtime allowances and paid rest breaks in exchange for a 2 cent per hour 
increase in pay. This, the report concludes, was estimated to have resulted in an 
average $91 decrease in net pay per week. Similarly, in the hospitality industry, a 
number of cases of alleged exploitation emerged as WorkChoices became law. The 
Office of Workplace Services (OWS) ii for instance initiated proceedings against pulp 
juice bar operator, POW Juice Pty Ltd, for alleged underpayment of twelve young 
employees (OWS 2006). Indeed, restaurants and cafes’ ‘high rates of non-
compliance’ in 2006 prompted the OWS to launch a targeted campaign in early 2007 
involving random wages and conditions audits of the industry (OWS 2007). 
 
Another case reported by Humphries (2006) in the Sydney Morning Herald shortly 
after WorkChoices came into effect, brought to public attention the industrial relations 
strategy of the owners of the Cowra Abattoir. The abattoir owners had chosen to 
terminate 29 meatworkers and then rehire 20 on arrangements that amounted to a 
$180 per week wage reduction. The employer had effectively relied on s.643 (8) of 
the newly amended WorkChoices laws which protects businesses from an unfair 
dismissal claim where an employee is terminated for 'operational reasons'. When the 
case was publicised, the OWS investigated and claimed that it had persuaded the 
company to withdraw the termination notices ‘despite evidence that Cowra Abattoir 
had complied with the Act’.   The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) seized 
upon these comments to demonstrate that Work Choices permits the unilateral 
reduction of wages and conditions (ACTU 2006a, 2006b).   
 
Aside from these more publicised cases, there were few other early empirical insights 
into the operation of WorkChoices. An exception came in May in the form of 
evidence provided to the Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Education 
(EWRE) Committee by the Employment Advocate, Mr Peter McIlwain, on the 
content of a sample of AWAs lodged between March 27, when WorkChoices took 
effect, and April 30, 2006. The Office of the Employment Advocate (OEA) analysed 
the contents of a small sample of 250 AWAs from a total number of 6263 lodged in 
the first month of the WorkChoices operation. The Employment Advocate’s evidence 
revealed that all AWAs expressly excluded at least one protected award condition 
while 16 per cent excluded all protected award conditions (Senate EWRE 2006). The 
evidence also revealed that 64 per cent excluded leave loading provisions, 63 per cent 
excluded penalty rates and 52 per cent excluded shiftwork loadings (Senate EWRE 
2006).  According to McIlwain, 78 per cent of AWAs in the sample provided a pay 
increase during the life of the agreement, meaning that 22 per cent did not. 
 
A number of AWAs were also found to have substantially and illegally derogated 
from the Australian Fair Pay and Conditions Standard. For instance, the Employment 
Advocate informed the Senate Estimates Committee that 14 per cent of AWAs 
provided casual employees with less than the mandatory 20 per cent loading. It is 
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important to note that under WorkChoices, agreements including AWAs take effect 
from the day of lodgement, hence the OEA has no power to prevent their registration 
on the grounds that they provide less than the five minimum conditions of the 
Australian Fair Pay and Conditions Standard. In circumstances where the OEA 
discovers illegal conditions, the agency refers these agreements to the OWS for 
further investigation. 
 
In November 2006, the Senate Estimates Committee on Employment, Workplace 
Relations and Economics met again. The Employment Advocate again gave evidence 
and informed the committee that a decision had been taken to discontinue the review 
of the contents of a sample of AWAs that had taken place for the first five weeks of 
WorkChoices operation (Senate EWRE 2006). As a result, it is not known how many 
AWAs exclude protected award conditions or provide a wage increase during the term 
of their operation. It is also unclear as to how many AWAs contain inferior and illegal 
conditions. However, McIllwain (the Employment Advocate) indicated to the 
committee that approximately 1700 AWAs, or a little below 1.5 per cent of all those 
AWAs lodged with the OEA, had been referred to the Office of Workplace Services. 
Upon further questioning from the members of the Senate Committee, it was revealed 
that it is OEA practice to review only a sample of AWAs that are lodged (Senate 
EWRE 2006). Hence it is from this sample that 1700 AWAs were found to contain 
conditions that were likely below the minima provided by the AFPCS.  Thus the 1700 
referred AWAs represents a much larger though unknowniii percentage of the sample 
of AWAs selected for review by the OEA. The actual number of AWAs that provide 
questionable and most likely inferior conditions of employment is unknown but likely 
to be much higher than the number referred to the OWS. This  suggests that there are 
significant numbers of AWAs that do not meet the minima of the AFPCS and which 
are therefore illegal. However, unless these agreements are identified in the sample 
reviewed by the OEA they are unlikely to receive further scrutiny. 
 
One of the more keenly anticipated events during 2006 was the handing down of the 
Australian Fair Pay Commission’s inaugural minimum wage decision. Under 
WorkChoices, the Australian Fair Pay Commission now has responsibility for 
reviewing the Federal Minimum Wage (FMW) from time to time and minimum 
award wages (Australian Pay Classification Scales), the special FMW, piece rates, 
periodic rates and casual loadings.   
 
The Australian Fair Pay Commission’s decision surprised many when it was delivered 
on 26 October, 2006. The AFPC announced an increase of $27.36 per week for award 
wages up to $700 per week (including the FMW) and $22.04 for wages above $700 
per week (AFPC 2006) citing a tight labour market and continuing economic 
prosperity in support of the decision.  As Waring, De Ruyter and Burgess (2006) had 
argued, the altered legislative arrangements for wage determination and the fairly 
opaque processes of the AFPC, suggested that it would not be predisposed to offering 
generous minimum wage increases. However, its first pay determination was close to 
the Australian Council of Trade Union’s call for an increase of $30 per week and, as a 
consequence, drew a hostile reaction from some employer associations such as the 
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry which described the decision as 
‘excessive and disappointing’ (Hendy 2006). In contrast, Prime Minister John Howard 
described the decision as ‘genius’ and ‘a very clever decision, a very fair decision’ 
(Howard 2006). The ACTU’s senior industrial officer, Belchamber (2006), has 
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suggested that the increase was similar in nominal terms to previous award safety 
rises granted by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission and offers two 
explanations for the decision; either that it was designed to quell criticism of the 
Commission and opposition to the Howard Government’s industrial relations policies 
more generally, or is an objective determination based on compelling evidence.   
 
Another important, though far less heralded event, came with the release of the Award 
Review Taskforce’s report on 3 November 2006 (Andrews 2006). The taskforce was 
established in October 2005 and was required to report on the rationalisation of 
federal awards and award wages and classification structures. The final report adopts 
principles that will most likely result in the rationalisation of approximately 4000 
federal awards (prior to March 2006) to between 100 to 150 awards. According to the 
recommendation of the taskforce, awards will be rationalised on an industry basis 
corresponding to the divisions of the Australian New Zealand Standard Classification 
(ANZSIC) (Award Review Taskforce, 2006). Given the extent to which agreements 
and awards are often inter-linked and ‘layered’ (see Bray and Waring 2005), the 
consequences of such a large reorganisation may be far-reaching. 
 
Finally, three other events in 2006 cannot go unnoticed in a review of the Australian 
labour market. First, in a split 5:2 decision (Kirby J and Callinan J dissenting), the 
High Court upheld the validity of the WorkChoices amendments. In essence the 
majority confirmed the capacity of s.51xx (the Corporations power) to fully regulate 
industrial relations. The decision validates the significantly extended reach of the new 
federal industrial relations jurisdiction and will clearly have significant consequences 
for industrial relations regulation whichever political party holds federal office in the 
future.    
 
Second, the amended Workplace Relations Act 1996 and the Workplace Regulations 
2006 were further amended on 15 December 2006. The amendments reduce some of 
the burdensome timekeeping requirements WorkChoices imposes; allows for the 
cashing out of sick and carer’s leave so long as an employee retains a balance of 15 
days; allows employers to stand down employees if they are idle due to factors 
outside of the employer’s control; cap the accrual of annual leave and carer’s leave in 
respect of worked hours above 38 and protect redundancy pay entitlements for a 
period of 12 months after an agreement has been terminated (NSW Parliamentary 
Committee on Social Issues 2006). 
 
Third, the federal Independent Contractors Bill  (2006) (Cth) and the Workplace 
Relations Legislation Amendment (Independent Contractors) Bill 2006 were passed in 
December but will not take effect until 2007. These related laws essentially override 
the deeming provisions in state industrial relations laws and also state legislative 
mechanisms for reviewing ‘unfair contracts’. Dr John Buchanan, in evidence given to 
the NSW Parliamentary Committee inquiry on the impact of WorkChoices, argued 
that the Independent Contractors Act’s consequences could be more significant than 
WorkChoices in time because it creates the space which will permit independent 
contractor arrangements to ‘flourish’ (NSW Parliamentary Committee on Social 
Issues 2006).  
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Taken together, these developments represent an unprecedented year of change in the 
Australian labour market; the effects of which will be felt in years to come. ‘Mimetic 
isomorphism’ or the pressure on employers to emulate others in response to similar 
environmental conditions, will gradually permeate the labour market but especially in 
low wage sectors where WorkChoices is likely to have a greater impact.  
 
Conclusion 
The Australian labour market experienced strong growth in 2006. The cumulative 
effect of over a decade of economic and employment growth is a record low 
unemployment rate and a record high labour force participation rate. Employment and 
wages growth have not, however, been evenly distributed across either demographic 
or geographic groups. As discussed above, the state of Queensland experienced 
employment growth of nearly 6 per cent in 2006, around twice the national average, 
while Tasmania experienced a 1.8 per cent reduction in the number of people 
employed. Similarly, while some regions are now recording zero unemployment, 
others, including some major metropolitan centres, continue to experience double 
digit unemployment rates. Finally, the incomes of those in employment rose unevenly 
in 2006. While those employed in the relatively highly paid sectors of mining and 
construction experienced strong wages growth, employees in the relatively poorly 
paid industries of retail and hospitality received some of the lowest average wage 
increases in 2006. 
 
While the labour market is performing well in terms of summary indicators such as 
the unemployment rate and the LFPR the benefits of a strong labour market are not 
being distributed evenly. It is clear that steady economic growth has not solved the 
problems of youth unemployment, regional unemployment or low wages in some 
sectors. It is, therefore, unlikely, that the continuation of current policies will solve 
such problems in the future. Now that the goal of low unemployment has been 
achieved perhaps the most important problem for policy makers is no longer the 
choice of policy instrument, but the choice of policy targets.  
 
The disparities emerging in the labour market with respect to wages and 
unemployment are of particular relevance in the context of the implementation of 
WorkChoices legislation. Those in low paid sectors, where labour is relatively 
plentiful and turnover costs are low, are especially vulnerable to price competition. 
WorkChoices has effectively lowered transaction costs for employers seeking to 
reduce labour costs by enhancing managerial prerogative to impose conditions of 
employment and establishing a near ‘employment-at-will’ environment. Ironically, 
while some employers may not wish to adopt the ‘low road’ employment relations 
options permitted under WorkChoices, they may have no choice where one or more 
competitors choose this path. The tight labour markets currently being experienced in 
some industries such as mining will prevent these options from being exercised for 
the time being, meaning that sharper differences in wages and employment outcomes 
are likely to be experienced by workers within the Australian labour market for some 
time to come. 
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i It is worth noting that Des Moore, an advocate for greater labour market deregulation has stated in 
relation to the Work Choices legislation that "On the one hand it (WorkChoices) purports to allow 
Australia's employers and employees the freedom and the choice to sit down and work out the 
arrangements that best suit them, but only the other hand, continues to severely constrain that freedom" 
Moore (2006). 
ii The federal industrial inspectorate enlarged under Work Choices.  
iii The Employment Advocate took a question on notice (W325_07) as to how many AWAs are 
sampled but at the time of publication, the answer had not yet been provided. 
